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BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
keeping with the underlying theory of cy pres. However, the instant decision
raises basic considerations which should lead to a legislative reevaluation of the
policies involved. Not merely testementary freedom is here involved; the public
reliaL -e upon the continuity of public trusts is also pertinent. Pennsylvania has
recognized this by abolishing, by statute, the requirement for a general intent,
charitable gifts in that jurisdiction passing cy pres wherever necessary unless the
testator has expressly provided otherwise by a gift over or remainder clause.30
In a time of social change, such a provjion recommends itself as a fair compromise
between private rights and the public interest and a preferable alternative to the
uncertainties inherent in the rule applying in New York.31
Will Consfruction
In In re Gautier's Will,3 2 the term "surviving" was used in a devise where
the first legatee took a life estate, the remainder to a determinable class or in the
alternative to a "surviving" class. In this situation the slight presumption is that
"surviving" means surviving the previous estate.33 Rules of construction,
however, need not be resorted to, when from a reading of the will in its entirety,
the testator's intention is dear.0 4 The Appellate Division,"5 seeking the intention
of the testator, referred to a later paragraph where the testator had declared,
"I have not made any provision" for Charles Gautier, a nephew. If "surviving"
meant surviving the life beneficiary, part of the estate could pass by intestacy,
and in that manner Charles Gautier's estate-could realize an intestate share.
On this basis the Appellate Division affirmed the Surrogate Court and found that
the testator's intention was that the term "surviving" meant surviving the
testator himself. Such a decision avoids any partial intestacy and provides for an
earlier, rather than later vesting of estates.
The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division and held that the
term "surviving" meant surviving the previous beneficiary. When the testa-
tor referred to survival of himself he used the words "survive me," indicating
that the term "surviving" refers to something different, and this supports the
slight presumption that in such a clause "survival" refers to the termination of
the previous estate. The fact that Charles Gautier has a possibility of an intestate
share, although not contemplated by the testator, is mere happenstance and not
an indication of the meaning of the word "surviving.
30. PA. ESrATES ACT OF 1947, 20 P.S. §301.10 (1947).
31. The requirement of general intent has been subjected to criticism.
See, e.g., 2A BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES, §436 (1935); Note A Revaluation of
Cy Pres, 49 Yale L.J. 303, 317-323 (1939).
32. 4 N.Y.2d 502, 169 N.Y.S.2d 4 (1957).
33. Fowler v. Ingersoll, 127 N.Y. 473 (1891); 2 JARMAN ON WILLS 759 (5th
ed. 1893); RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY §251 (1940).
34. In re Pubis, 220 N.Y. 196, 202. 115 N.E. 516, 518 (1917).
35. In re Gautier's Will, 3 A.D.2d 750, 160 N.Y.S.2d 238 (2d Dep't 1957)
and 3 A.D.2d 752, 161 N.Y.S.2d 574 (2d Dep't 1957).
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It is the writer's opinion that the word "provision" does not relate to an
intestate share, but merely to an express bequest of the will itself. There is,
therefore, no conclusive proof that the testator did not contemplate, or in fact
desire that Charles Gautier retain the possibility of an intestate share. As the
Court points out, at least he evinced no intention that he was to be excluded as
next of kin. A court may not rewrite a will to avoid intestacy.3 6 This appears
to be especially true where such a rewriting was not dearly desired by the testator.
Escheat of Decedent Veteran's Estate
Under a federal escheat statute,37 federal pension benefits paid to an
incompetent beneficiary who dies intestate with no surviving distributees, are to
escheat to the United States if, under the laws of the state wherein the beneficiary
last resided, they would escheat to the state.
In In re Hammond's Estate,3 8 both the state and federal governments sought
control of the federal pension funds which comprised the estate of an incompetent
veteran, who died intestate with no surviving distributees.
The state contended that there was no escheat of these unclaimed estate
funds to the state, that under the present New York laws the state does not
assert absolute title to such funds but takes possession and holds them in a
custodial capacity for the benefit of unknown living distributees who may forever
come forward and claim them.39 Since, technically, the term escheat means that
title to such property must pass to the state absolutely,4 0 with all rights present
in unknown surviving distributees cut off forever,41 there is no longer any eschear
under New York laws and therefore the federal escheat statute does not apply to
the estate funds in question to determine their disposition.
In unanimously rejecting the state's argument, the Court of Appeals stated
that the term "escheat" in the federal statute must not be given such a narrow
interpretation as to defeat the manifest purpose of the statute, which is to secure
for the United States the use and benefit of funds originally paid to federal
beneficiaries which would otherwise become the property of the state.
Since, under both the federal escheat statute42 and present New York laws,
36. In re Englis' Will, 2 N.Y.2d 395, 161 N.Y.S.2d 39 (1957).
37. Act of July 3, 1930, ch. 849, 450(3), 49 STAT. 993. (Now 71 STAT. 136
(1957), 38 U.S.C. 3502(d), Supp. V 1958).
38. 3 N.Y.2d 567, 170 N.Y.S.2d 505 (1958).
39. N. Y. SuR. CT. AcT §272.
40. Johnson v. Spicer, 107 N.Y. 185, 80 N.Y.S.2d 125 (1887); Crowner v.
Cowdrey, 139 N.Y. 471, 68 N.Y.S.2d 493 (1893).
41. N.Y. ABANDONED PROPERTY LAW §§201, 203.
42. See Opinion of the Solicitor of the Veterans Administration, 1946.
